Law&aposs conventionality does not require every disagreement be a disagreement in application. Positivists do recognize discretion, and some disagreements, which are disagreements in content, are best thought of as disagreements about how the law should be extended. I know that in Dworkin&aposs view they are always disagreements about what the law is. But again, the choice between these two views has to be made on theoretical grounds. Dworkin and I simply have conflicting but internally consistent characterization
Stephen Perry accuses Hart of failing to countenance that there are many “insider&aposs” points of view. Perry argues that Hart privileges one kind of “insider&aposs point of view”: the point of view of the person who accepts the law as legitimate, and reason giving accordingly: in other words, his version of the “internal point of view.” Perry argues Hart must defend his privileging this particular insider&aposs perspective. Perry then claims that such a defense presupposes both a particular conception of
it is the presence of a rule of recognition criteria of validity that distinguishes law from other systems of social rules. Thus. . Dworkin&aposs criticism fails because it mischaracterizes positivism as providing a criterial explanation of the concept of law. On Hart&aposs view. according to Hart.of what distinguishes systems of law from other systems of social rules.Use one of your book credits to continue reading from where you left off, or restart the preview.